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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants (collectively "Hermes") are entitled to their day in court, where their
evidence and the equities of the case may be weighed. The trial court improperly
awarded injunctive relief on summary judgment without balancing any equities, and in
the face of disputed issues of material fact. To be eligible for injunctive relief on
summary judgment, Appellees were required to present undisputed material facts
showing special damages and irreparable harm. They were required to show something
more than merely an "impact." They were required to show with undisputed record
evidence the extent of their claimed injury, and that such injury was "irreparable." There
was no such showing. Finally, Hermes was entitled to all reasonable factual inferences in
its favor. It received none. Thus, this Court should reverse the mandatory injunction
summary judgment.
This Court should reverse also because the trial court abused its discretion in
granting injunctive relief by ordering Hermes to comply with inapplicable zoning
ordinances and standards, based on the erroneous assumption that such standards had
previously and authoritatively been determined as applicable. In fact no prior court,
including this Court, ever specifically determined which zoning ordinances and standards
should apply.
Finally, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to apply, or failing to even consider applying, the "balance of the equities" test
prior to awarding injunctive relief and requiring the demolition of occupied buildings.

345085 3

This refusal and failure was based on an impermissibly broad reading of this Court's
prior opinion, which the trial court unfortunately interpreted as precluding it from
exercising any discretion.
ARGUMENT
I.

DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED THE TRIAL
COURT FROM PROPERLY GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The trial court ignored genuine issues of material fact in awarding injunctive

relief.
A.

Because of Disputed Facts, the Trial Court Should Not Have Found
"Special Damages"
1.

Standing to Sue is Not Before the Court

In its opening brief, Hermes showed several disputed factual issues concerning
Appellees' alleged special damages. In response, Appellees acknowledged the disputes,
but now claim they are immaterial, arguing that to obtain injunctive relief they merely
needed to demonstrate that they had been impacted by Hermes' development to a greater
degree than the general public. (E.g., Br. Appellee at pp. 24-27.) Citing to Harris v.
Springville City, 712 P.2d 190, 191 (Utah 1986), Appellees argue that "[a]ll that matters
is whether [they] have suffered damages 'more substantial than those suffered by the
general public.'" (Br. Appellee at p. 26, quoting Harris, 712 P.2d at 191.) A cursory
review of the Harris decision shows, however, that its reasoning is limited to the question
of standing. Id. at 190 (stating that "[t]his Court granted the rehearing to consider
plaintiffs' standing to bring this suit."). The issue of Appellees' standing to assert claims
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for injunctive relief is not before this Court. That issue was resolved previously. E.g.,
Culbertson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., 2001 UT 108, ^ 51 ("Plaintiffs ... have standing
to seek injunctive relief under section 17-27-1002.")
2.

Appellees Were Required to Show Extent of Damages

Rather than simply rest on a demonstration of a disparate impact, Appellees were
required to prove "special damages." The mere fact that Appellees may have incurred an
impact different from the general public only establishes their standing to assert the
claim. In order to properly obtain injunctive relief, Appellees must demonstrate the
extent of their "special damages." This, of course, is precisely what this Court in
Culbertson required, specifically stating (after finding Appellees had standing), "A
private individual must both allege and prove special damages .... The trial court, of
course, did not reach and made no finding on summary judgment regarding the extent of
plaintiffs' injuries. It is now necessary to remand the case to the trial court to make that
determination"" Id. at \\ 54-55 (emphasis added). The trial court made no such
determination.
3.

Hermes Presented Record Evidence Disputing Appellees' Evidence
of Special Damage

On remand, Appellees again moved for summary judgment based on supposed
undisputed facts which, they claimed, demonstrated their special damages—"facts" going
to general access to the property, access for municipal services, light, noise, and aesthetic
value. In response, Hermes provided record evidence disputing these facts. Hermes
showed, for example:
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•

alternative access to the property. (R. at 2661-62, 2711.)

•

reasonable access for trash pickup and other municipal services. (R. 266061; see also R. at 1085, 1118-20).

•

access for fire protection. (R. at 1216-28, 2827.)

•

ability to provide snow removal. (Id.; see also R. at 847, 1204.)

Hermes' evidence was directly contrary to facts Appellees presented in support of their
alleged special damages, and thus summary judgment could not have been proper.
4.

Hermes is Entitled to Have All Evidence Viewed in Its Favor

Appellees are not entitled to summary judgment unless "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact. .. ." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A trial court may properly grant a
motion for summary judgment. . . only when reasonable minds could not differ on the
facts to be determined from the evidence presented. . . . [and] [t]he trial court must assess
those facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Olympus Hills
Shopping Ctr.y Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs.} Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). In other words, Hermes was entitled to have all evidence viewed "in a light most
favorable to finding a material issue of fact." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'I Cos., 842 P.2d
865, 867 (Utah 1992). Hermes did not receive this inference.
Rather than such a weighing in Hermes' favor, the trial court never explicitly
considered the facts. Had they been properly considered and weighed in Hermes' favor,
the trial court would and should have recognized there were material factual disputes
concerning the effect of Henries' development on Appellees and their property, making

345085.3

4

summary judgment improper.
5.

Hermes' Facts Are "Material"

Appellees claim also that Hermes' factual disputes are immaterial. Yet the trial
court's opinion and Appellees' own supporting memoranda show this claim is
hypocritical. In its memorandum decision, the trial court noted Appellees' standing, then
incorporated "herein in full the special and unique damages more fully described in
plaintiffs Memoranda in support and reply...." (R. at 3346.) Among others, those
"damages" (set forth in Appellees' own moving papers, and relied upon by the trial court)
included the following: (1) that Appellees' sole means of access to their property is by
way of 1070 East and North Union Avenue; (2) that hook-and-ladder fire trucks cannot
access Appellees' Property along 1070 East; (3) that large sanitation, snow plow,
emergency and other vehicles cannot access Appellees' property; (4) that vehicles
traveling to the end of North Union Avenue in front of Appellees' property must either
back up or use the Property and its driveways to turn around; (5) that noise has destroyed
Appellees' peaceful use and enjoyment of their property; and (6) at night, lights shine
light inside the residences located on the property and prevent Appellees from sleeping.
(R. at 2062-63.) Appellees cannot have persuaded the trial court of the materiality of
these facts, and now claim they are immaterial.
Hermes' factual disputes are material because the trial court, and Appellees
themselves, made them material. Hermes' facts directly contradict the facts presented by
Appellees. Hermes was entitled to the benefit of the disputed facts, and the trial court
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erred when it did not require a full trial on the merits. Any Hermes' direct and record
evidence rebutting these "damages" is, necessarily, material, and thus summary judgment
was improper.
B.

Because of Disputed Facts, the Trial Court Should Not Have Found
"Irreparable Harm"
1.

"Irreparable Harm" Cannot Be Assumed, But Must Be Shown

Arguing that all they need to show is a disparate impact, Appellees claim that
irreparable harm is, in essence, assumed after they demonstrate an impact on themselves
different from any on the general public. Thus, Appellees argue that "[i]f a plaintiff
establishes (1) a zoning violation, and (2) that he has been specially damaged thereby, the
'irreparable harm' requirement has been met." (Br. Appellee at p. 34.) This argument is
contrary to this Court's prior decision in this case, and ignores Utah's injunction
jurisprudence in general.
In order to obtain injunctive relief in Utah, the claimant must demonstrate
"irreparable harm." E.g., Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d
870, 881 (Utah 1996) (Injunctive relief appropriate only upon showing of irreparable
injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.). Irreparable harm is defined as
Wrongs of a repeated and continuing character, or which occasion damages
that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard, are
included . . . . "Irreparable injury" justifying an injunction is that which
cannot be adequately compensated in damages or for which damages
cannot be compensable in money.
System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Utah 1983).
Appellees take issue with Hermes' citation to such authority, claiming that this
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oft quoted definition does not apply because the case did not specifically address zoning
issues. Appellees claim instead that for zoning purposes, .=
damages. Appellee > ci.,

'

'

^uui a proposition. {Br. Appellee at

HP {i \ M,) Rather thev base their argument on Section ! ~~~2~^-1-')02 of the Ttah t ode
and on this Court *^ prior decision in this case,
Section 1'.-..
I Iir- ' eilion -. •

;<

,i.
•

--

.

.:

\ppellees'position.

~IA- • A\\\ owner of real property to "instituie" an injunction, i.e.,

seek to obtain one. While the provision states unequivocali\ mai a "coin:;) :.•,*• .
establish the violation to obtain the injunr\. . ..;i.i

p^.^,

;r,

-

: ' !•

'< -

UMIO

y

such

'andowners like Appellees. And here, where Hermes

was acting in conformity with County mandates, Appellees particularly lack any
presumption in their private favor.
* i illees no support on this issue, either.
Instead, it specifically recognized that nri\ ate landowners must demonstrate irreparable
harm prior to obtaining injunctive relici. nuiing ma;. -,\ u;. :eg.u "although mis sec,

; .:

'-\.

••

.',

iviuuah> and counties may seek

iiijiiiKliuri to remedy a zoning violation, it singles out the county in its provision
requiring only the establishment of the violation . .*. * , ; ^ : u
Culbertsoi\ .^
the iiiL.

<

.

.d, ^ear k \ppellees and to

, *i\c lehef is available unl^ \\:,en intervention o: a ,^i;i1 of

t\\\\\\\ is essential to protect against 'irreparable injury' and when granting it is consistent
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with the 'basic principles of justice and equity.'" Id. at ^f 51.
Appellees' next argument is equally unsupported. They argue that because this
Court in Culbertson stated that a zoning violation is a "significant factor" in the
irreparable harm equation, 2001 UT 108 at f 55 n. 23, the only remaining factor must
therefore be the showing of "special damages." (Br. Appellee at p. 35.) Appellees cited
no authority for such a self-serving proposition, and no such authority exists. Rather,
Appellees refer to the Harris decision of this Court—a case that dealt solely with the
issue of standing. See, supra.
Appellees' suggestion of irreparable harm thus fails for at least three reasons.
First, as discussed previously, the showing of "special damages" offered by Appellees is
only sufficient to grant them standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief. Second,
Appellees ignored the express direction of this Court:
We recognize that the trial court denied a temporary restraining order in
Culberton I [sic] because it found plaintiffs showed no irreparable injury.
Another determination is necessary based on our holding that a zoning
violation occurred.
Culbertson at 2001 UT 108 at f 55 n. 23. Thus, on remand this Court required Appellees
to demonstrate irreparable harm, which the trial court was then to consider in light of a
zoning violation. This did not happen. Finally, even if Appellees were correct in their
arguments on these points, injunctive relief was improper because disputed issues of
material fact remain as to special damages.
2.

Disputed Factual Issues Preclude a Finding of "Irreparable Harm"

Appellees urge that even if they were required to make a showing of irreparable
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harm, the undisputed material facts show that their supposed injuries are irreparable. In
support., Appellees criticize Hermes for arguing that because rca. ; : - - . r

o

appraisal, any damage sulTeied > an IM » aleuLiinl A|^prll<*^s misunderstood Hermes'
argument. As Hermes' stated previously, Appellees made no showing of irreparable
harm. Rather, they gave only vague descriptions of harm to aesthetic \ a^L, ......
•;

supposed damage related to access to

• •.•

ilesei iptions, il www well be that "diminution of value" is adequate to assess damages.
Notwithstanding this paucity of evidence, Appellees erroneous!) uaim tiu.t
Hermes' reasoning in suggesting tacL;^ :> a;. • M.K > ,. >
- . •

- *

...

>

?

'

ui JUJ. it has hoL Carrier involved a dispute

between private landowners over an alley that ran between their homes. Defendants built
a wall that extended into the an*, v. A/IWH./ZL,' i:,;a n w,;;-. c\ a^u
• • La. . .:

•'•*,•

*

J:

.

L-

.;>J

. ..'"i - -= .« -: l

• •• t! of the wall. As Appellees acknowledge,

the Carrier (Joint undertook a separate irreparable harm analysis. Regarding irreparable
harm, the Carrier Court, in response to the argument ma* ..j-m was mcasura* •
«. .

•

•

laeess, stated that

[defendants ... fail to recognize olhei harm that plaintiffs suffer, harm thai
clearly exists based on the undisputed facts in the record [such as] plaintiffs
are now restricted even time they want to deliver heavy or large items to
the rear of their homes. ... Plaintiffs will suffer obvious inconvenience,
extra cost, and hardship in order to proceed with plans such as repairing a
roof, building a shed, storing a boat, or \ indertaking major landscaping."

1

Without offering any support, Appellees claim such an analysis was undertaken only
because there was no zoning violation, at issue.
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Carrier, 2001 UT 105 at ^f 26 (emphasis added). Such language shows, in fact, the Court
did consider whether the claimants' harm could be compensable with money damages,
finding only after a review of the undisputed material facts of record that they could not.
The Carrier case turned on undisputed facts of injury and undisputed knowledge of
violation of law—both of which are plainly disputed here. Indeed, Appellees never
presented any facts, undisputed or otherwise, of specific injuries similar to those in
Carrier. Carrier stands for the proposition that when injuries can be compensated with
money damages, irreparable harm will not lie, and injunctive relief is inappropriate.2
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REQUIRED HERMES TO
COMPLY WITH NON-APPLICABLE ORDINANCES AND STANDARDS
The trial court erroneously granted mandatory injunctive relief based upon

ordinances and zoning provisions that have no application in this case. In response,
Appellees confuse, misstate, or just plain ignore the procedural history of this case, the
impact of this Court's prior decision, the record evidence, and the plain text of the
ordinances and standards in question. Rather than show their claimed statutes do apply,
Appellees claim, in words to that effect, waiver and res judicata.
A.

Hermes Properly Raised the Issue of Non-Applicable Ordinances

Appellees attacked Hermes' position first by claiming that Hermes must have
previously agreed to such standards and ordinances because the first time Hermes raised

This proposition is the full extent to which the trial court should have relied on Carrier.
Instead, the trial court improperly adopted in full the reasoning of the Carrier Court
without acknowledging or accounting for the significant factual differences between the
cases, including scienter.

345085.3

10

them was in its objection to the form of the order issued by the trial court below; First,
this implicitly concedes the statutes and ordinances are improper, claiming some kind of
waiver. Seconc;. t;ic pri^uimu, u;..>U);;v ,,i u,i.> ^u:vc .^U...., Uu-.i waim.
W 1 lile i\ ppellees first raised specific ordii lances ii 1 their first i i lotioi 1 foi si it i n nary
judgment filed with the trial court some seven years ago (R. at 575), Hermes also moved
for summary ju.dgm.ent that the roads surrounding Appellees' property were no longer
pi iblic roads, tl n is i i laking tl. ic application c f statutes at id ordinal ices i mnecessai )

(R.

1040-52.) Consideration of the applicability of specific ordinances indeed was rendered
moot, when the trial court granted Hermes' motion, "concluding thai North
j.:::

MIMM-

-licet arc not pui ;:^ >treeis anu mereiorc ,;.. iu.; . .o.aiL ; \. ,

or county ordinance requirements for ni:H : / n w : . " ('

\ -

On appeal, Appellees argued thai the streets were public, and therefore specific
ordinances applied. (Br. Appellant, filed August 24,, 1.990. at pp. 20, 2 7 .^ Hermes again

filed October 15, 1999, ulpp. 31-4U.J 1 he primary issue prewoa^ty before this Court
was, of course, the public or private nature of the roadways in question, and not !hc
pren lat ure issue of tl le applicability of specific oi dinai ices and stati ite s. I hat issi ie did n :)t
squarely arise until the trial court, on remand from this Court, required Hermes to comply
with specific ordinances and statutes—precisely when Hermes raised the issue. In any
ev erit, pi ioi to entr> of its injunction order, I Icniies did raise the issue and the trial court
overruled thai or;.* ":o:*-
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B.

This Court Never Determined Which Ordinances Apply

Appellees argue also that Hermes was too late because the Culbertson Court
purportedly already held that Hermes had violated the statutes previously specified by
Appellees. Again, Appellees ignore the procedural posture of the case, and the language
of this Court's prior opinion.
This case was here on a prior summary judgment, the trial court having earlier
concluded that "North Union Avenue and 1070 East Street are not public streets and
therefore do not violate the CUP or county ordinance requirements for public streets."
Culbertson, 2001 UT 108 at \ 10. On appeal of that decision, this Court held for
Appellees, reversing the grant of summary judgment by finding that the roads
surrounding Appellees' property remained public, and that the roadways were required to
comply with the applicable zoning ordinances and standards. Nowhere did this Court
specifically determine or identify which ordinances and standards applied. That, of
course, would and should be left to the trial court.
Instead, with regard to the two roads surrounding Appellees' property, this Court
stated: (1) "Because the segment of North Union Avenue ... is a public street, the County
must comply with the CUP and all other county zoning and roadway ordinances;" and (2)
"because 1070 East is a public way, it is subject to county zoning and roadway
ordinances and the CUP." Id. atffl[43, 46. This Court did acknowledge the specific
ordinances mentioned by Appellees: "Plaintiffs seek a declaration that [the roads] do not
comply with the Salt Lake County Roadway Standards.... [and] that Hermes'

const! tietinn

' mhilr , Ihr ( 1 11* and sections 19.70.155 and K\7o.21U of the omul}

code for lack of twenty-foot landscaped setbacks and curb, gutter, and sidewalk
improvements , " Id, at*1" • 'ui-' -.i -< ^ * <aa >
- iv.^.u. \ v. .••
\ r-:-

acknowiecigcn.

'

<- .

endorsement, or a factual finding.

In Ihr end, this Court limited its holding to reversing summary judgment, finding that the
roads were public, and therefore, genetically, "subject to county zoning am; . - - ;v
ordinances ana n\, v
I 'his

insistent with the review function of this Court. The case was

before this Court on re\ iew of summary judgment. Id. at ^f 11 Finding that summary
judgment incorrect, this Court reversed an.; remain
enli") ol summary |udgincnt tor" Appellees and thus the issues of the applicability of
specific ordinances and standards were left for the trial court. The trial court assumed,
rather than found, application of Appellees' specific statutes.
C.

That tin1 1 mill

I'u iiml"" n t .,omn;> "\ iohliou i, liiiiiiaJYiial

: Vppellecs also argue that this Court did find a "zoning violation," urging the
Court could not have so found without first determining which ordinances applied. ' 1 1 lis
leap is not merited by the recor.
iaigcly 'vjM.-d

•

* / .

.••

%
• as

. •*-. .,- | concession of Hermes that if the roads are in fact public,

they admittedly do not comply with the roadway standards, the CUP, and were hi*ie.
without any setback. E.g., id. at \ JO. Based on such a concession, this Cuuil i iiiiM, anJ

did, find a zoning violation without specifically determining which of many possible
specific ordinances and requirements applied.
D.

Many of the Trial Court's Specified Ordmances Do Not Apply

In response to Hermes' arguments that many of the zoning ordinances imposed by
the trial court do not apply on their face, Appellees confuse and misconstrue the
applicable ordinances, and accuse Hermes of playing mathematical games. Appellees
apparently wish to prevent any court from engaging in the process of analyzing the actual
ordinances, and Appellees apparently have no desire to have their math tested in an
evidentiary setting. Hermes is entitled to such an analysis as a matter of due process, as it
plainly shows here many of the ordinances imposed by the trial court have no, or at least
a diminished, application in this case.
1.

There is No 20-Foot Setback Requirement

Without restating its entire argument on this point, neither the CUP nor the
applicable zoning ordinances support a requirement for a 20-foot setback from the street
to the buildings along 1070 East and Fort Union Avenue. Appellees claim two sources
for such an alleged requirement—zoning ordinances and the Conditional Use Permit.
a.

Zoning Ordinances Do Not Require a 20-foot Setback

Salt Lake County Ordinance 19.62.090 addresses Side Yards only, defined as "a
space on the same lot with a building, between the side line of the building and the side
lot line, and extending from the front yard to the rear yard."

Salt Lake County

The only applicable Side Yard in question would be the area and building adjacent to
1070 East, and not the area and building adjacent to North Union Avenue. If anything,
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this ordinance to a traditional corner lot, for example the lot occupied by the Federal
Courthouse in Salt Lake City—a traditional "corner" lot bounded by 4th South and Main
Street. There, the "interior angle of intersection" of the lot lines would be 90 degrees,
resulting in this traditional corner lot falling, appropriately, within the "Corner lot"
ordinance. On the other hand, if one measures the interior angle of the roadways, the
angle would be 270 degrees (the opposite of the interior lot angle), with the odd result
that a traditional corner lot falls outside the statutory definition of "corner lot."
That Hermes' interpretation is correct can be seen simply by referring to similar
ordinances throughout the country. Most municipalities have a virtually identical
definition of "corner lot," and some include graphic depictions of the requirements. For
example, below, at Figure 1, is an excerpt of the zoning code of Clark County, Nevada.
Clark County similarly defines "corner lot" as a "lot abutting two (2) intersecting streets,
where the interior angle of intersection does not exceed one hundred thirty-five (135)
degrees. Clark County Unified Development Code § 30.08 Definitions L (available at
http://www.co.clark.nv.us/comprehensive_planning/Current/Title30/Title30_08_L.htm.)
As the graphical depiction clearly shows, the critical angle of measure is that "interior" to
the lot in question abutting on the intersecting or intercepting streets:
1. "Comer Lot" means a lot abutting two (2) intersecting streets, where the interior angle of
intersection does not exceed one hundred thirty-five (135) degrees.
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Figure 30.08-5 Comer Lot
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Appellees claim that such an imeiprctation is nonsensical, resulting in buildings on one
side of a 90° corner having a 20-foot setback requirement, while the buildings on the
other side would not. In this case, however, such a result is perfectly sensible. Common
sense dictates that one of the primary purposes of comer lot setbacks is safety, i.e., to
allow traffic approaching on one street a view of oncoming traffic around the corner. In
that case, the only critical "view" is across the 90° corner of the lot- • in this case,
Appellees" !•* " '-.ere i> n<* :• vre^poiHlin^ "critical view" at ihe 2riJ" reverse-corner of
Hermes' lot.
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recognized in the Culbertson decision, the CUP requires only curb, gutter, and sidewalk
along the property lines that abut any public road or street, a fact that Hermes does not
contest. Culbertson, 2001 UT 108 at ^ 5, 15, & n. 14. Nevertheless, in support of their
argument, Appellees have taken out of context a handwritten notation on one of the
superseded maps that states that "all buildings to have min. 20' yard setbacks from the
street property lines." (R. at 642.) Later versions of these maps do not include the handwritten notation. (E.g., R. at 3438.) Additionally, Salt Lake County development
director Ken Jones testified that the hand-written notation was simply referencing the
applicable zoning requirement, presumably 19.62.090, and not additional restrictions. (R.
at 1093, 2643.) If there is any dispute on which map applies here, then an evidentiary
hearing is naturally the appropriate venue to resolve the dispute.
2.

Appellees' Argument to Widen the Old Road is Unsupportable

In response to Hermes' argument that the roadway ordinance does not require
Hermes to widen North Union Avenue beyond its original pre-development width of 33
feet, Appellees accused Hermes of a strained reading of the Culbertson opinion. Yet, the
opinion clearly explains that when originally constructed, and for many decades, the
portion of North Union Avenue abutting Appellees' property on the north had a width of
only 33-feet from property line to property line. Culbertson, 2001 UT 8 at Tf 3.
Thereafter, Salt Lake County vacated the northernmost eight feet, and "closed" the
remaining 25 feet. With regard to that "closed" portion, this Court determined that it
remained a "public highway:" "We . . . hold that the twenty-five-foot-wide closed portion

345085 3

1 R

of North Union Avenue abutting the Croxford property remains a public highway, or a
public street, for purposes of the Salt Lake County ordinances." Culbertson, 2001 UT
108 at \ 42. Regarding the eight-foot vacated segment abutting Hermes' property, this
Court noted that "[w]hen the County permitted Hermes to place [its] back wall ... on the
vacated eight-foot segment of North Union Avenue, it deprived plaintiffs of their
easement over that strip." Id. at If 42 n. 19. According to this Court, then, the damage to
Appellees was the deprivation of the eight-foot segment. This Court never required that
Hermes give Appellees a nine-foot windfall in addition to restoring the eight feet. Yet
that is precisely what the trial court did, relying upon Appellees' claims. At most,
Appellees should be entitled only to the restoration of the original and historical right-ofway width of 33 feet for North Union Avenue. Courts have never required that
preexisting roadways suddenly and without explanation be upgraded to current standards.
Appellees next argue that such reasoning "ignores the fact that [Hermes] dug up
the portion of old North Union Avenue bordering Plaintiffs' property and constructed an
entirely new roadway less than 25 feet wide," implying that by Hermes' building such a
new roadway, it should be required to comply with then-current roadway standards.
There is no "new" roadway. Indeed, Appellees' own record citations belie support for a
supposed "entirely new roadway," since they merely state that "[i]n August and
September 1994, Hermes' contractors blocked off and tore out portions of North Union
Avenue...." (E.g., R. at 2052 (emphasis added).) The torn-out "portions," of course,
would be the vacated eight-foot strip upon which Hermes built.

1Q

3.

Hermes Should Not Be Required to Construct a Cul-de-Sac When
Other More Reasonable Solutions Have Not Been Considered.

Appellees accuse Hermes of a half-hearted request to eliminate the cul-de-sac
requirement imposed by the trial court. Rather than making a request, however, Hermes
simply pointed out here that the trial court ignored the possibilities of other legitimate and
logical solutions to the dead-end street, which of course it could not consider without the
benefit of hearing evidence.5
Appellees' position is also curious given their initial suggestion of further court
proceedings to consider the "details" of any requested relief. At the hearing on
Appellees' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Appellees' conceded that "there
probably is some discretion in the details." (R. at 3711 (Hr'g Tr., 2/23/04, p. 25).) As
counsel suggested, "let's come back and have a hearing and then the [trial] Court can
answer the injunction with details and I think that's what the Supreme Court was
concerned about in remanding that there ... needed to be an effort made to find out what
the details of how this would be implemented will occur and we are not adverse to having
that take place ...." (Id. pp. 25-26.) The trial court erred when it ignored Appellees'
suggestion, and Appellees now seek to have the benefit of the extreme position they
never thought the trial court would adapt.

5

Appellees chide Hermes for suggesting the possibility of converting the dead-end street
into a through street, "presumably by constructing a mammoth Evel Knievel-like
rampway." (Opposition Brief at p. 48, n. 23.) Very funny. Appellees' indifference to
reasonable alternatives is punitive and myopic.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO BALANCE THE
EQUITIES, RESULTING IN A LOPSIDED, INEQUITABLE REMEDY
The trial court erred in refusing to balance the equities in this case. In response,

Appellees reassert the same arguments that take this Court's prior opinion out of context
and ignore this Court's critical limitation on its "finding." Indeed, the same critical
limiting language was ignored by the trial court, resulting in the trial court wrongly
concluding it had no discretion to balance the equities.
A.
Appellees Admit the Balance of Hardships Doctrine is Appropriate
When the Defendant Proceeds Without Knowledge of Violation
Appellees admit that the "balance of hardships" doctrine is appropriately used in
the case of an "innocent defendant," i.e., a defendant that proceeds without knowledge
that it is violating zoning ordinances. Indeed, Utah law is clear on that point: in the case
of a violation of zoning ordinances, a court may order injunctive relief without balancing
equities only if the offending party constructs a building or operates a business with
willful disregard for the county's rules and regulations. E.g., Utah County v. Young, 615
P.2d 1265, 1266-67 (Utah 1980) (holding that a court may order injunctive relief, only if
the offending party constructs a building or operates a business with willful disregard for
the county's rules and regulations). In the absence of knowingly willful misconduct, the
trial court must "balance the equities" before granting equitable relief. E.g., Papanikolas
Bros. Enter, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1975). So
the question remains, was Hermes "innocent."
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B.

The Trial Court, and Appellees, Misconstrue Supreme Court Dicta

Appellees argue, and the trial court unfortunately found, that "the Supreme Court
already determined that the violation of the zoning ordinances was willful and
deliberate." (R. at 3351; see also Br. Appellee, pp. 50-51.) Both Appellees and the trial
court apparently read "Hermes acted willfully and deliberately when it constructed its
buildings," as meaning "Hermes willfully and deliberately violated zoning ordinances."
While such an inference is "possible," it should never have been made when the
consequence is to tear down occupied buildings in an active and vibrant shopping center.
Most importantly, there is no dispute that the original trial court refused to make any
findings on scienter. (R. at 1985 (Hr'g Tr., Jan. 22, 1988, at pp. 148-156)). Such editing
of this Court's prior opinion is improper, and cannot justify the trial court's refusal to
balance the equities.
This Court in Culbertson neither explicitly stated nor implied that Hermes
willfully violated zoning ordinances. Contrary to Appellees' argument, a reasonable
interpretation of the Court's actual wording is that the question of deliberate and willful
violation of zoning ordinances was to be left up to the consideration of the trial court.
The trial court never made such a consideration, however. Instead, it wrongly concluded
that this critical factual finding had been previously made by this Court.
C.

Appellees5 Cited Authorities Offer No Support

Appellees argue that the "overwhelming weight of caselaw" supports their
argument that the balance of hardship doctrine does not apply when the developer knew
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of a plaintiffs' claims but proceeded with construction even when it had received all
requisite permits and approvals. However, a simple perusal of the cited cases shows that
none stand for that specific proposition, and none offer Appellees legitimate support.
In Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So.2d 191, 206 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001), the
relief granted was specifically not based on a finding of irreparable harm. The nature of
the defendant's conduct, and balancing equities, was simply not at issue. Conversely, in
the instant case, this Court specifically found that Appellees must show "irreparable
injury" as an element of their action for injunctive relief. Culbertson, atfflf51-55.
In Welton v. 40 East Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1934), the court
engaged in the very balancing of equities process that the Appellees suggest here is
improper. Id. at 381. Further, this decision came after a full trial on the merits, where all
equities were aired and advanced. Lastly, the Welton court was able, after reviewing the
factual record, to order that the decree be reversed, "with directions to grant a mandatory
injunction in accordance with the views herein expressed." Id. at 383. Thus, it was
unmistakable that no discretion was left to the trial court, in stark contrast to this case.
In Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, ^f 8, the defendants built into a disputed
alley in the face of actual and official knowledge that the alley was not theirs to build
into. Here, in contrast, Hermes had express Salt Lake County endorsement of their
actions, and only Appellees' mere opinions in contrast.
In Little Joseph Realty, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 363 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (N.Y.
1977), the developer's conduct was not at issue; rather, the issue was whether an asphalt

plant was incidental to a governmental use of the land for waste disposal and therefore
not barred by the zoning ordinance.
In Moore v. Pettus> 71 So.2d 814, 819-22 (Ala. 1954), the defendant obtained an
illegal building permit based upon a non-public vote of only three members of a fivemember board of adjustment, when the affirmative vote of four members was required
for a variance. Moreover, the defendant greatly exceeded the scope of the building
permit-regardless of its alleged legality.
In Bach v. Sarich, 445 P.2d 648, 653 (Wash. 1968), the developer did not go
through the extensive public approval process, as Hermes did here, but instead simply
obtained a building permit to build out onto and into a lake in the face of not only
objections from the plaintiffs, but clear legal precedent to the contrary.
In Davis v. City of Abilene, 250 S.W.2d 685, 685-88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952), the
property owners obtained a building permit from the building inspector, who allowed
them to build in plain violation of a building ordinance. Additionally, the property
owners built in violation of both the ordinance and the permit.
In Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227, 229-30 (Utah 1992), the court
did not address the issue of balancing the equities. Rather, the issue was whether the trial
court properly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for laches.6

6

Appellees cite an additional twelve cases without analysis or specific description in
footnote 27 of their opposing brief. Such cases are inapplicable to the present discussion
for the simple reason that, per Appellees' own general description, they did not involve
"official approval," similar to the approval that Hermes had obtained here.
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D.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion

With respect to the remedy to be awarded, this Court noted in Culbertson precisely
that the trial court would have "latitude in fashioning an appropriate remedy" and
remanded with the direction to "award plaintiffs a remedy in accordance with this
opinion." Culbertson, 2001 UT 108 at | 57. Thus, this Court granted the trial court
latitude, or discretion. In fact, the trial court's ultimate failure to exercise discretion
amounts to an abuse of discretion. E.g., Polleschev. Transamerican Insurance Co., 497
P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1972) ("[T]his court will not interfere with such ruling, unless the
abuse of, or failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the trial judge is clearly shown.").
Here the failure to exercise any discretion is conceded. That the trial court expressly held
it had no discretion, concluding that such discretion to balance the equities was precluded
by this Court's prior opinion regarding "willful violation," should now be remedied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court
and remand the case for a trial on the merits, to reconsider whether injunctive relief in
light of applicable ordinances and standards is appropriate, and to determine then whether
vibrant and occupied commercial buildings should be torn down.
DATED this

of April, 2005.
Snell&WilmerL.L.P.

Mark O. Morris
David P. Williams
Attorneys for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

of April, 2005, two true and correct copies

of the foregoing were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019

idfoxflfl.-

